

## Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 209613

42

ORIGIN NEA-05

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EA-07 /013 R

66603

DRAFTED BY: NEA/INS:JELEADER

APPROVED BY: NEA/INS:DKUX

EA/TB:CLSTERMER (SUBS)

----- 066141

R 241353Z OCT 73

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0000

S E C R E T STATE 209613

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO BANGKOK

CANBERRA

DACCA

ISLAMABAD JAKARTA KATHMANDU KUALA LUMPUR LONDON MANILA

MOSCOW NEW DELHI PHNOM PENH ROME SAIGON SINGAPORE SEOUL TAIPEI

TOKYO VIENTIANE WELLINGTON HONG KONG PEKING CINCPAC FROM

RANGOON OCT 20

QUOTE

S E C R E T RANGOON 2472

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, PFOR, BM, CH

SUBJECT: PRC POLICY TOWARDS BURMA: SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR SEA  
NEIGHBORS

SUMMARY:

A. BURMESE ARMY IS NOW ENGAGED IN SOME OF HEAVIEST  
FIGHTING IN ITS HISTORY AGAINST BURMA COMMUNIST PARTY  
INSURGENTS WHO ARE UNDER CHINESE OPERATIONAL DIRECTION.

IN VIEW OF BURMA'S FIXED POLICY SINCE ESTABLISHMENT OF  
PRC TO SEEK LATTER'S FRIENDSHIP AND ALLAY ITS SUSPICIONS,  
PRC'S FLAGRANT ABUSE OF BURMESE SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH  
INSTRUMENTALITY OF BCP IN SHAN STATE RAISES SERIOUS  
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 209613

QUESTION WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE FOR SMALL ASIAN STATES  
TO CO-EXIST PEACEFULLY WITH PRC SHORT OF COMPLETE  
SUBSERVIENCE TO LATTER'S WILL.

B. I DISCUSSED SUBJECT THIS WEEK WITH FOUR OF MY COLLEAGUES WHO HAVE EXCELLENT CONTACTS WITH PRC EMBASSY HERE FROM WHICH THEY HAVE GOTTEN LINE THAT WHILE GOVERNMENT RELATIONS BETWEEN RANGOON AND PEKING ARE GOOD AND GPRC DOES NOT INTERFERE IN BURMESE AFFAIRS, BCP ADMITTEDLY RECEIVES HELP FROM CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY. THIS IS JUSTIFIED ON GROUNDS THAT AS PARTY DEDICATED TO WORLD REVOLUTION CCP HAS DUTY TO COME TO AID OF FRATERNAL PARTY WHICH REQUESTS IT. BURMESE HAVE RECEIVED SAME EXPLANATION FROM THE CHINESE BUT ARE HARDLY REASSURED.

C. MY COLLEAGUES AGREE THAT BCP INSURGENCY REPRESENTS SERIOUS CHINESE POLITICAL AND MILITARY INTERFERENCE IN BURMESE AFFAIRS AND ARE MUCH CONCERNED AS TO WHAT THIS MEANS FOR BURMA AND SEA IN GENERAL. WHILE RECOGNIZING PRC LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE AS WORLD REVOLUTION, NONE OF THEM IS QUITE SURE OF PRC'S SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES. THESE MAY RANGE FROM CONCERN FOR SAFETY OF ITS BORDERS (IN VIEW OF SOVIET ENCIRCLEMENT THREAT) TO EXERTION OF PRESSURE AGAINST GUB AND RTG. GUB MEANWHILE IS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED AT SITUATION BUT HAS REFRAINED FROM PUBLICIZING IT, PRESUMABLY ON BASIS THAT THIS WOULD MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR CHINA TO CHANGE ITS POLICIES.

D. CHINESE OBVIOUSLY HAVE CAPABILITY OF PROVIDING BCP WITH SUFFICIENT RECRUITS AND EQUIPMENT TO BLEED GUB FORCES TO DEATH IN LONG RUN. THUS GUB MAY BE FACED EVENTUALLY WITH PAINFUL ALTERNATIVES OF (A) SEEKING SUBSTANTIAL GRANTS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM ABROAD, (B) YIELDING SUBSTANTIAL TERRITORY TO BCP (E.G. ALL OF KENG TUNG) OR (C) REACHING COMPROMISE WITH BCP EVEN TO EXTENT OF COALITION GOVERNMENT WHICH COULD LEAD TO GUB'S SUBSERVIENCE TO PRC. END SUMMARY.

1. FOR PAST SEVERAL WEEKS BURMA ARMY HAS BEEN  
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 209613

CONDUCTING THE LARGEST SINGLE MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN THE TWO YEARS I HAVE BEEN HERE. GUB HAS MUSTERED 5,000 TROOPS IN NORTHEAST KENG TUNG STATE AGAINST A FORCE OF 3,000 BURMESE COMMUNIST PARTY (BCP) INSURGENTS, WHO ARE REPORTEDLY BACKED BY 2,000 RESERVES. GUB HAS HAD SOME INITIAL SUCCESSES, DECLARED GUB OBJECTIVE IS TO DRIVE BCP OUT OF KENG TUNG STATE WHERE IN PAST FEW MONTHS BCP INSURGENTS HAVE REPEATEDLY INTERDICTED TAUNG GYI/KENG TUNG ROAD, PRINCIPAL EAST-WEST ARTERY IN SOUTHEASTERN SHAN STATE. BCP ALREADY OCCUPIES VIRTUALLY ALL BURMESE TERRITORY NORTH OF KENG TUNG AND EAST OF SALWEEN. BURMESE MILITARY LEADERS ARE SAID TO REGARD CURRENT FIGHTING AS SOME OF THE MOST

CRUCIAL SINCE BURMA'S INDEPENDENCE.

2. THIS MAJOR MILITARY EFFORT HAS SIGNIFICANCE BEYOND BURMA'S BORDERS. EVIDENCE WE HAVE ACCUMULATED DURING PAST TWO YEARS IS NOW EVERWHELMING THAT BCP IN SHAN STATE IS COMPLETELY A CREATURE OF CHINA, I.E. IT IS UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF CHINESE MILITARY HEADQUARTERS IN YUNAN, SUPPLIED AND EQUIPPED FROM CHINA, LARGELY RECRUITED AND TRAINED IN CHINA, AND ENCADRED WITH CHINESE TECHNICIANS AND SPECIALIST.

3. WHAT MAKES THIS SITUATION ESPECIALLY REMARKABLE IS FACT THAT OF ALL CHINA'S NON-COMMUNIST NEIGHBORS NONE HAS BETTER RECORD OF EXTENDING HAND OF FRIENDSHIP TO PEKING THAN DOES BURMA. IT HAS BEEN FIXED POLICY OF BURMA SINCE ESTABLISHMENT OF PRC TO SEEK FRIENDSHIP WITH PEKING. BURMA HAS FROM THE FIRST SCRUPULOUSLY ADHERED TO A NON-ALIGNED POLICY. ESPECIALLY IN THE PAST TWO OR THREE YEARS, BURMA HAS CONSPICUOUSLY AVOIDED CLOSE RELATIONS WITH EITHER THE SOVIET UNION OR THE US IN AN EFFORT NOT TO AROUSE CHINA'S SUSPICIONS. IN VIEW OF GUB'S RECORD, PRC'S FLAGRANT ABUSE OF BURMA'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH INSTRUMENTALITY OF BCP INSURGENCY IN SHAN STATE RAISES SERIOUS QUESTION AS TO WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE FOR SMALL ASIAN STATES TO CO-EXIST PEACEFULLY WITH PRC SHORT OF COMPLETE SUBSERVIENCE TO PEKING'S WILL.

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 209613

RM DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS I HAVE DISCUSSED SINO/BURMESE RELATIONS WITH JAPANESE, PAKISTANI, BRITISH AND ITALIAN AMBASSADORS WHO HAVE ENJOYED EXCELLENT CONTACTS WITH PRC EMBASSY HERE. ALL FOUR HAD DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT OF SINO/BURMESE RELATIONS WITH THE PREVIOUS PRC AMBASSADOR CHEN CHAO-YUAN, INCLUDING MATTER OF CHINESE AID TO BCP. (THE NEW CHINESE AMBASSADOR, YEH CHENG-CHURG, HAS PROVED THUS FAR TO BE MUCH LESS APPROACHABLE THAN CHEN). ALL FOUR OF MY COLLEAGUES AGREED THAT SHAN STATE BCP INSURGENCY REPRESENTED SERIOUS CHINESE POLITICAL AND MILITARY INTERFERENCE IN BURMESE AFFAIRS AND ALL WERE MUCH CONCERNED AS TO WHAT THIS MEANS FOR BURMA AND FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA IN GENERAL.

5. ALL FOUR HAD GOTTEN SAME LINE FROM AMBASSADOR CHEN: THAT GOVERNMENT RELATIONS BETWEEN RANGOON AND PEKING WERE GOOD AND THAT CHINESE DID NOT INTERFERE IN BURMESE AFFAIRS; BUT ADMITTEDLY BCP RECEIVED HELP FROM THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (CCP) WHICH AS A PARTY DEDICATED TO WORLD REVOLUTION HAD A DUTY TO COME TO THE AID OF A FRATERNAL PARTY WHICH REQUESTED SUPPORT.

6. THE BURMESE THEMSELVES HAVE, OF COURSE, GOTTEN THE SAME EXPLANATION FROM THE CHINESE, I.E. THAT ANY HELP RECEIVED BY THE BCP FROM CHINA WAS STRICTLY A PARTY AFFAIR. BUT THE BURMESE CAN HARDLY BE REASSURED BY BEING TOLD IN EFFECT THAT THEIR TROOPS ARE BEING RILLED BY CCP NOT CHINESE GOVERNMENT BULLETS.

7. WHILE MY FOUR COLLEAGUES AGREED THAT THE BCP INSURGENTS ARE INSTRUMENTS OF CHINESE POLICY, NONE WAS QUITE SURE OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THIS POLICY. ON THE ADMISSION OF THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR HIMSELF, WORLD REVOLUTION IS ONE OF THE OBJECTIVES BUT ALL AGREED THAT THIS IS LONG-TERM, AND THERE MUST BE SHORT-TERM CHINESE OBJECTIVES WHICH DO NOT INCLUDE THE EARLY OVERTHROW OF THE GUB.

8. THE PAKISTAN AMBASSADOR GAVE CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT TO CHINESE FEAR OF SOVIET ENCIRCLEMENT OF BURMA. THE  
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 209613

CHINESE SUSPECT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE HEAVILY INFILTRATED THE BURMA SOCIALIST PROGRAM PARTY (BSPP), BURMA'S ONLY LEGAL PARTY, WHICH WILL PRESUMABLY ACHIEVE ENHANCED POWER FOLLOWING

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 11 MAY 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** PARAMILITARY FORCES, WAR, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, PEACE PLANS, COMMUNISTS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 24 OCT 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** morefirh  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1973STATE209613  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** NEA/INS:JELEADER  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1973/newtext/t19731066/abqcejfs.tel  
**Line Count:** 189  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** ORIGIN NEA  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** morefirh  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:** ANOMALY  
**Review Date:** 28 AUG 2001  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <28-Aug-2001 by boyleja>; APPROVED <06 MAR 2002 by morefirh>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** PRC POLICY TOWARDS BURMA: SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR SEA NEIGHBORS  
**TAGS:** PINT, PFOR, BM, CH  
**To:** n/a INFO COLOMBO  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005